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Troubling Patterns in Canadian Refugee Adjudication
BY SEAN REHAAG*
This article uses data obtained from Canada's
Immigration and Refugee Board IIRBI to calcu-
late the refugee claim grant rates of individual
IRB adjudicators.The data reveals that, in 2006,
grant rates varied significantly across adjudica-
tors. Some adjudicators accorded refugee status
in virtually all cases the) heard; others granted
refugee status rarely, if at all. The article
explores several explanations offered by the
IRB for refugee claim grant rate variations.
These explanations relate to patterns in case
assignment due to adjudicator specialization in
particular types of cases from particular regions
of the world. The author contends that while
patterns in case assignment do affect grant
rates, the)' do not account for the full variations
evident in the data. Rather, outcomes in refugee
adjudication appear to hinge, at least in part, on
the identity of the adjudicator assigned.
The author draws three main conclusions from
the data on refugee adjudication in 2006. First,
further empirical research should be undertak-
en to verify the results of the study and to iden-
ti f specific features of adjudicator identity that
affect refugee claim outcomes. Second, the
appointment process for IRB adjudicators
should be carefully scrutinized in light of grant
rate disparities. Third, given both the grant rate
disparities and the life and death stakes involved
in refugee adjudication, it is imperative there be
opportunities to meaningfully review negative
first instance refugee determinations. To this
end, the government should immediately
implement the provisions in Canada's immigra-
tion legislation that establish a Refugee Appeal
Division at the IRB.
Cet article calcule le taux d'accueil des revendi-
cations du statut de r~fugi6 par arbitre i l'aide
de donn~es de la Commission d'immigration et
du statut de r~fugi6 [CISRI. Cette &ude r~vdle
que I'acceptation des revendications, en 2006,
variait sensiblement d'un arbitre i I'autre; cer-
tains accordaient presque invariablement le
statut de r~fugi6, alors que d'autres le faisaient
rarement, voire m~me jamais. L'article examine
diverses explications de ces variances fournies
par la CISR. Celles-ci ont trait t la repartition
du travail en tenant compte de la sp&ialisation
des arbitres pour certains types de dossiers
provenant de certaines r~gions du monde. Tout
en reconnaissant que ce facteur puisse Jouer
dans le taux d'accueil des revendications du
statut de r~fugi6, l'auteur soutient que cela
n'explique pas totalement la grande variance
observ~e dans les d~cisions rendues. I1 semble
que l'identit6 de I'arbitre qui 6tudie le dossier y
joue une part 6galement.
L'auteur tire trois grandes conclusions A partir
des donn~es d'arbitrage de 2006 en mati~re du
statut de refugi. Premi~rement, il faudrait
entreprendre d'autres recherches empiriques
afim e v&ifier les r~sultats de cette &ude et de
cerner certains traits de l'identit6 de l'arbitre
qui influent sur la decision d'accorder ou non le
statut de r~fugiL Deuxi~mement, il y aurait lieu
d'analyser attentivement la procedure de nomi-
nation des arbitres A la CISR en tenant compte
de la grande disparit6 dans les dcisions.
Troisi~mement, &ant donn6 la grande disparit6
dans les d&isions et les enjeux de vie et de mort
lis l'arbitrage en mati~re du statut de r~fugi6,
il est impratif de pr~voir des m~canismes val-
ables pour le contr6le des dtterminations n~ga-
tives au premier palier. A cette fin, le
gouvernement devrait imm~diatement mettre
en ceuvre les dispositions de la loi canadienne
sur I'immigration relativement la creation
d'une Section d'appel des r~fugis i la CISR.
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Troubling Patterns in Canadian Refugee Adjudication
BY SEAN REHAAG
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, a widely discussed newspaper article raised concerns regarding differential
refugee claim grant rates among adjudicators at Canada's Immigration and Refugee
Board (IRB). I The article noted that some adjudicators granted refugee status in over
80% of the refugee claims they heard, whereas others denied all the claims they
heard. According to the article: "Immigration and refugee lawyers say what they term
the wild variation in . . . acceptance rates is unacceptable and underscores the fact
that some of these political appointees make life-and-death decisions in an arbitrary
manner." ' In response to these allegations, a spokesperson for the IRB suggested:
(Tihe variation in acceptance rates can be explained, in part, by the fact that members
specialize in certain regions .... Some individuals with a high volume of positive cases
... preside over "expedited or fast-track" cases from war-torn countries that are accept-
ed by a case officer and then approved by board members. 3
The present article assesses these divergent understandings of the large dis-
parities in refugee adjudicators' grant rates through a study of recent data obtained
from the IRB. The article begins by briefly outlining the refugee determination
process at the IRB to provide a context for the study. It then sets out the methodol-
ogy through which the data for the study was obtained. Next, it presents the data,
highlighting the dramatic variations it reveals in the grant rates of refugee adjudica-
tors. The article then evaluates the arguments related to selective case assignment put
forward by the IRB to explain grant rate variations and concludes that patterns in case
assignment fail to account for the full variations evident in the data. Instead, the
divergent grant rates appear to result, at least in part, from factors unrelated to the
merits of refugee claims, namely, the identity of refugee adjudicators. Finally, the
article explores several implications of the study's central finding that refugee deter-
minations in Canada appear to hinge to some degree on the identity of the adjudica-
tors assigned to particular claims.
I. Marina Jim Nez, "Refugee approval rates vary widely: Some board members reject all applicants" The Globe
&Alail (24 July 2004) Al.
2. Ibid.
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II. IRB REFUGEE DETERMINATIONS
Canada has developed a complex refugee determination system to meet its obliga-
tions under both international refugee law and Canadian constitutional law.4 The
most important step in that system is a refugee hearing at the IRB.5 When IRB
adjudicators-known as "Board Members"-preside over hearings, their primary
responsibility is to determine whether claimants meet the refugee definition set out
in Canada's immigration legislation. 6 According to this definition, a refugee is:
[A] person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to
avail themself of the protection of each of those countries.
7
It is worth noting that there are extremely serious consequences to IRB
determinations regarding whether claimants meet the refugee definition. On the
one hand, a large number of false positive decisions could put the entire refugee
determination system at risk. In particular, reports of false positive decisions may
foster popular perceptions that the refugee determination system is vulnerable to
abuse from economically motivated migrants seeking to circumvent regular immi-
gration procedures. This could lead to calls for further limiting access to refugee
protection in order to protect the ability of the government to set and enforce
immigration policy.8
On the other hand, the possible consequences of false negative refugee deci-
sions are even more severe. False negative decisions leave individuals who, in fact,
meet the refugee definition vulnerable to deportation to countries where they face
persecution, torture, or even death. 9 Indeed, these possible consequences are so
3. Ibid.
4. For a list of the broad policy objectives of Canada's refugee determination system, see Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 3(2) [IRPAI. For a general overview of the refugee determination
system and its relation to international and constitutional law, see Martin Jones & Sasha Baglay, Refugee Law
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at 30-69, 215-253. For a comprehensive discussion of international refugee
law, see James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005).
5. IRPA, ibid., s. 170(b); Jones & Baglay, ibid. at 236 states: "The centerpiece of the Canadian refugee determi-
nation process is the oral hearing of the claim."
6. IRPA, ibid., s. 107. Note that Board Members must also determine whether individuals who fail to meet the
refugee definition nonetheless meet the definition of "person in need of protection," ibid., ss. 97, 107.
7. Ibid., s. 96(a). See also ibid., ss. 98, 101, 108, for further limits on the refugee definition.
8. For an example of a call to limit access to Canadian refugee protection based on such arguments, see
Stephen Gallagher, "Canada's Dysfunctional Refugee Determination System: Canadian Asylum Policy from a
Comparative Perspective" (2003) 78 The Fraser Institute's Public Policy Sources 1.
9. IRPA, supra note 4 (Under Canadian immigration legislation, only refugees and other protected persons are
entitled to non-refoulement, that is to say, the right not to be removed to countries where they face "perse-
cution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion
or at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.," s. 115). See also Canadian Council for
Refugees, Report, "The Refugee Appeal: Is No One Listening?" (31 March 2005), online: Canadian Council
for Refugees <http://www.ccrweb.ca/refugeeappeal.pdf> ("IAI wrong decision may mean that a claimant
is sent back to face persecution, torture and even death." at I).
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severe that the Supreme Court of Canada has held that refugee determinations
engage refugee claimants' constitutional rights to life, liberty and security of the per-
son guaranteed by section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.'0
Furthermore, the severe consequences of false negative refugee determinations
accrue not only to the individuals whose claims are wrongly denied, but also to the
Canadian government. More specifically, deporting individuals who, in fact, meet the
refugee definition may violate international refugee law." Therefore, Canada is at risk
of breaching international law when erroneous negative refugee determinations
cause individuals who meet the refugee definition to be vulnerable to deportation.
Given the immense stakes at play in refugee decisions, the IRB has been struc-
tured as an independent administrative tribunal. 2 Board Members, who are appoint-
ed by the Governor in Council, 3 hold office for a set term, during which time they
can only be removed with cause.14 This security of tenure ensures that Board
Members presiding over refugee hearings are able to assess whether individuals meet
the refugee definition without undue government interference. 5 Such independence
is particularly significant, considering that governments may be reluctant to recog-
nize refugees from certain countries due to strong financial or diplomatic pressure
from abroad, or due to domestic political considerations. ' 6
10. Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 119851 S.C.R. 177 at 207, 17 D.L.R. (4th) 422
[Singh cited to S.C.R.]; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
1I. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UN.T.S. 150, Can.T.S. 1969 No. 6 (entered
into force 22 April 1954, accession by Canada 4 June 1969) ("No Contracting State shall expel or return...
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threat-
ened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion." art. 33(1)). See also Hathaway, supra note 4 ("lilt is one's de facto circumstances, not the official
validation of those circumstances, that gives rise to Convention refugee status . . . ." at 158).
12. IRPA, supra note 4, ss. 15 1-186. See also Bourbonnais v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 1754, 1200514
F.C.R. 529 at paras. 49-57, 267 F.T.R. 169 (reviewing the main features of the IRB and concluding at para.
57 that "Parliament intended to give the IRB and its divisions a certain measure of independence, but that
this judicial independence does not have the same scope as that given to courts of law and superior court
judges.") [Bourbonnais cited to F.C.R.l; Zrig v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT
1043, 120021 1 F.C. 559, 211 F.T.R. 219 (holding at para. 74 that the appointment terms of Board Members
comply with "the minimal requirements of administrative independence") IZrig cited to EC.I.
13. For a discussion of the IRB appointment process, see Part VII. B, below.
14. IRPA, supra note 4, s. 153(1).
15. For a general discussion of the importance of the independence of I RB Board Members, see Gerald
Heckman & Lorne Sossin, "How Do Canadian Administrative Law Protections Measure Up to International
Human Rights Standards?The Case of Independence" (2005) 50 McGill L.J. 193 at 252-57.
16. For discussions of the role of political considerations, including foreign policy considerations, in refugee
determinations, see Matthew E. Price, "Politics or Humanitarianism? Recovering the Political Roots of
Asylum" (2004) 19 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 277; David Corlett,"Politics, Symbolism and the Asylum Seeker Issue"
(2000) 23:3 U.N.S.W.L.J. 13;Tanya Basok & Alan Simmons, "A Review of the Politics of Canadian Refugee
Selection" in Vaughan Robinson, ed., The International Refugee Crisis: British and Canadian Responses (London:
MacMillan Press, 1993) at 132;The Harvard Law Review Association, "Prisoners of Foreign Policy: An
Argument for Ideological Neutrality in Asylum" (1991) 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1878; Gil Loescher & Laila
Monahan, eds., Refugees and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
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While the independence of Board Members offers important protections
against inappropriate government interference in refugee adjudication, this inde-
pendence sometimes makes it difficult for the IRB to achieve another key policy
objective: consistency across refugee determinations made by different Board
Members. 17 It goes without saying that outcomes of refugee determinations-in
which the human rights and the very lives of refugees may be at stake-should hinge
on the merits of refugee claims presented, not on the identity of the Board Member
who happens to be assigned to a particular claim. To this end, the IRB has adopted
several measures to increase consistency in refugee adjudication across Board
Members. 8 These measures include: enhanced training for Board Members; 9 the
use of "guidelines" issued by the Chair of the IRB;20 the designation of certain deci-
sions as "jurisprudential guides" or "lead cases";"' and having staff lawyers review
draft decisions.22 However, these efforts aimed at enhancing consistency across
Board Member decisions have proven to be controversial. In particular, a number of
these measures have been subject to constitutional challenges on the grounds that
they inappropriately fetter the discretion of Board Members, thereby compromising
their independence .23
17. Peter Carver, "Guides' Honour: A Note on Procedural Guidelines and the Decisions in Thamotharem v.
Canada (M.C.I.) and Benitez v. Canada (M.C.I.)" (2006) 40 Admin. L.R. (4th) 279 ("For a high-volume tribunal
that operates through regional offices across Canada, dealing with an often controversial subject matter-all
of which describes the IRB-a driving interest in achieving consistency is understandable." at 286); Peter
Showier, "Consistency in Decision Making" (Speech presented to the Council of Canadian Administrative
Tribunals, Ottawa, 12 June 2000), online: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada <http://www.irb-
cisr.gc.ca/en/media/speeches/2000/ccat e.htm> ("Tension clearly exists between the need for consistency
and the independence of decision makers." at "Consistency in Decision Making").
18. For overviews of the measures taken to enhance consistency at the IRB, see ShowIer, ibid. at "Consistency
Initiatives"; Peter Showier & Lori Disenhouse, "Tribunal Management: In Search of Nimbleness" (Speech
presented to the Council of Canadian Administrative Tribunals, Ottawa, 3 June 2002), online: Immigration
and Refugee Board of Canada <http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/media/speeches/2002/ccat-e.htm>;
Francois Cr~peau & Delphine Nakache, "Critical Spaces in the Canadian Refugee Determination System:
1989-2002" Int'l J. Refugee L. [forthcoming in 20081.
19. Showier, ibid. ("The IRB regularly develops training sessions on areas where there are inconsistencies in deci-
sion making." at "Remedial Initiatives"). However, some commentators suggest that training for Board
Members could be dramatically improved. See e.g. Cecile Rousseau et aL., "The Complexity of Determining
Refugeehood: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the Decision-making Process of the Canadian Immigration and
Refugee Board" (2002) 15 J. Refugee Stud. 43 at 45, 67.
20. IRPA, supra note 4, s. 159(1 )(h). For an excellent discussion of the impact of one chairperson's guideline, see
Nicole LaViolette, "Gender-Related Refugee Claims: Expanding the Scope of the Canadian Guidelines"
(2007) 19 Int'l I. Refugee L. 169.
21. IRPA, ibid., s. 159(1)(h); Showier & Disenhouse, supra note 18 at "Chairperson's Guidelines and Lead Cases."
22. Showier & Disenhousc, ibid. at "Reason's Review."
23. See e.g. Bovbel v. Canada (Minister ofEmployment and Immigration), 11994] 2 F.C. 563, 113 D.L.R. (4th) 415
(C.A.) (involving a challenge to the reviews of draft decisions by IRB staff lawyers); Geza v. Canada (Minister
ofCitizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 124, (sub nm. Kozak v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)) [2006] 4 F.C.R. 377, 267 D.L.R. (4th) 54 IGeza cited to F.C.R.1 (involving a challenge to the
practice of designating lead cases); Thamotharem v. Canada (Minister of Citzenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA
198, 60 Admin. L.R. (4th) 247 (involving a challenge to the chairperson's guidelines).
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In considering the proper balance between consistency and independence at
the IRB, and in evaluating whether the existing refugee determination system com-
plies with both constitutional and international law, it is important to develop a
sophisticated understanding of the extent to which outcomes in refugee determina-
tions vary according to the Board Members assigned to particular claims. However,
empirical assessments of such variations are methodologically challenging. The major
challenge is that the vast majority of refugee decisions are unreported, and the few
reported decisions do not constitute a representative sample of all refugee determi-
nations at the IRB.24 This challenge is compounded by the fact that Board Members
are generally not required to provide written reasons for positive decisions.25 The
remainder of this article seeks to contribute to the ongoing discussions about consis-
tency in Canadian refugee adjudication by attempting to overcome these method-
ological challenges through an empirical study of variations in refugee claim grant
rates based on new data obtained from the IRB.
III. THE METHODOLOGY OF THE CURRENT STUDY
The IRB maintains a database of all claims they hear. While this database is not direct-
ly accessible to the public, the Access to Information Act 26 sets out procedures through
which it is possible to obtain some of the information contained in the database.
To this end, the data in the present study was obtained through a formal Access to
Information Request to the IRB, which requested:
the following information for all cases involving principal claimants decided by the
Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board where a decision was
mailed to the claimant in 2006: (1) File Number; (2) Claim Type; (3) Claim Type Details;
(4) Country of Origin; (5) Gender of the Principal Claimant; (6) Decision; (7) Date the
Decision was Mailed; (8) Name of the Board Member.
2 7
In response, the IRB provided a list of the requested information. 2 This
list was then digitized and extraneous information was filtered out, 29 producing
24. Jenni Millbank, "Imagining Otherness: Refugee Claims on the Basis of Sexuality in Canada and Australia"
(2002) 26 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 144 at 149; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Decisions,
"RefLex," online: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
<http://www.irh-cisr.gc.ca/en/decisions/reflex/index-e.htm?action=about#reflexO3>. Note that deci-
sions are selected for publication by the IRB when: "[tlhe reasons set out a novel approach to the law"; "Itihe
reasons set out the law in a clear and concise manner"; "Itlhe reasons demonstrate the application of an
established legal principle to an unusual or novel fact situation"; or "Ithe reasons are representative of a
number of decisions decided on a specific issue from a particular country, or are representative of a number
of decisions decided in a particular region of the IRB." at "3. Selection Criteria."
25. Refugee Protection Division Rules, S.O.R./2002-228, s. 6(1)-(2).
26. R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1.
27. Sean Rehaag, "Access to Information Request Form" (IS May 2007) Ion file with author].
28. Letter from EricVillemaire, Director, Access to Information and Privacy, Immigration and Refugee Board to
Sean Rehaag (21 June 2007), IRB File #: A-2007-00023 / de, online: Canadian Council for Refugees
<http://www.ccrweh.ca/documents/rehaagdata.htm> [IRB Letterl.
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a database of 9,984 refugee claims involving principal claimants where a positive
or negative decision was mailed to the claimant in 2006. It is worth emphasiz-
ing that the database does not include all refugee decisions made in 2006
because the data is restricted only to decisions involving principal claimants. In
other words, it does not include refugee claims made by accompanying partners
or dependent children. To put the database into context, according to the United
Nations High Commission for Refugees, there were 19,827 cases decided at the
IRB in 2006, of which 17,369 resulted in positive or negative decisions, with the
remainder being otherwise resolved. 30
IV. GRANT RATES OF IRB ADJUDICATORS
According to the data provided by the IRB in response to the Access to Information
Request, little has changed since the 2004 media article on variations between the
grant rates of particular Board Members in refugee cases. 31
In 2006, some Board Members accorded refugee status in all the cases they
heard, including Robert Owen (26 cases) and Jean-Pierre Beauquier (50 cases).
Other Board Members who decided larger numbers of cases also had very high
refugee grant rates. For example, Gilles Ethier (138 cases) had a grant rate of 95.65%
and Martin Ginsherman (202 cases) had a grant rate of 94.55%.
In contrast, during the same period other Board Members accorded refugee
status in a dramatically lower percentage of the cases they heard. For instance,
Sajjad Randhawa (46 cases) had a grant rate of only 2.17%. Other Board Members
with higher caseloads also had extremely low grant rates. For example, Roger
Houde (90 cases) had a grant rate of only 6.67% and Suparna Ghosh (119 cases)
had a grant rate of 9.24%.
Table 1 offers an indication of the significant differences between the grant
rates of Board Members. This table lists the five highest and five lowest grant rates for
Board Members who decided at least 50 principal claimant refugee claims in 2006.
The full list of grant rates for individual Board Members is also reproduced in the
Appendix to this article. In perusing Table I and the Appendix, one cannot help but
be struck by how dramatically grant rates vary from one Board Member to the next.
29. The IRB provided a list of 11,998 records. Of these, 972 involved multiple listings for single claims; 1,017
involved cases that were abandoned, withdrawn or otherwise administratively resolved; and 25 were records
where no information regarding the Board Member was provided.
30. "Asylum Applications and Refugee Status Determination by Country of Asylum and Level in the Procedure,
2006" in UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2006: Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions (Geneva: UNHCR,
2007) atTable 7, online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics.html>.
31. See text accompanying note 1.
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Table I: Five Highest and Lowest Grant Rates in Principal Claimant Refugee Cases in 2006
for IRB Members Deciding at Least 50 Cases
Board Member Decisions Grant Rate
(%)
Lowest Houde, Roger 90 6.67
Five
Ghosh, Suparna 119 9.24
Wong, Bing 68 11.76
Freilich, Miriam 123 13.01
Weir, Margaret 128 16.41
Subtotal 528 11.74
Highest Ledercq, Dominique 80 91.25
Five
Kitdener, Susan 107 92.52
Ginsherman, Martin 202 94.55
Ethier, Gilles 138 95.65
Beauuier, Jean-Pierre 50 100
Subtotal 577 94.45
Total at IRB in 2006 9984 54.08
V. IRB EXPLANATIONS FOR DIVERGENT GRANT RATES
Anticipating that these widely divergent grant rates would be evident from the data
provided in response to the Access to Information Request, the IRB appended a let-
ter to the data. This letter volunteers an explanation as to why Board Members' grant
rates vary significantly.32
The IRB's explanation for divergent grant rates turns on the notion that
cases are not randomly assigned to particular Board Members. To the contrary,
Board Members "are often grouped into specialized geographical teams so that they
can develop expertise in specific country conditions." 3 As a result, according to the
IRB, divergent grant rates among Board Members reflect patterns in the types of
cases assigned:
ITlhe number of claims that an individual member may accept or reject is related to the
nature of the claims that the member hears and the countries of origin involved.
Conclusions or inferences should not be drawn from acceptance rates. For example, a
member with a large caseload for countries that are democratic with a respect for the
rule of law may have a lower overall acceptance rate than a member with a large case
load from countries where the rule of law is not respected. 34
32. IRB Letter, supra note 28 at "Members' Acceptance Rates: Explanatory Note."
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
343
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Similarly, the IRB notes that some Board Members, "by the nature of their par-
ticular assignment, may do a large number of expedited cases. Expedited cases will
bring about mostly positive decisions since they involve cases that appear to have a
manifestly well-founded basis."35
VI. EVALUATING EXPLANATIONS FOR DIVERGENT GRANT RATES
The IRB is correct to suggest that some of the variation in grant rates can be attrib-
uted to the fact that Board Members frequently specialize in certain types of cases.
For example, all but one of the refugee cases assigned to Jean-Pierre Beauquier (50
cases) in 2006 resulted in expedited positive decisions. Given that decisions as to
whether to expedite claims are made administratively, prior to assigning cases to par-
ticular Board Members, and considering that claims are only expedited where their
success appears to be very likely, 36 it is understandable that Beauquier had a 100%
grant rate. Indeed, as Table 2 shows, Board Members who decide a significant num-
ber of expedited cases are likely to have very high grant rates.
Table 2: Grant Rates For IRB Members With Over 40 Expedited Positive Refugee Decisionf
Involving Principal Claimants in 2006
Board Member Expedited Positive Overall GrantDecisions Rate (%)
Quirion, Richard 120 91.03
Ginsherman, Martin 173 94.55
3eauquier, Jean-Pierre 49 100
Total 342 93.95
The IRB is also correct to suggest that geographic specialization has an effect
on individual Board Member grant rates. Consider, for instance, A.C. Knevel, whose
grant rate was only 29.71%. This below average rate seems more evenhanded when
one considers that the majority of the cases Knevel decided in 2006 involved claimants
from countries with low grant rates. In fact, as Table 3 shows, the average grant rate
adjusted to take into account the countries of origin of the claimants whose cases
Knevel decided in 2006 is 29.60%. That is to say, Knevel's low grant rate closely tracks
the expected grant rate for adjudicators hearing the set of cases that he decided.
35. Ibid.
36. For a description of the requirements for a claim to be expedited, see Immigration and Refugee Board of
Canada, Fast Track Policy: Expedited Process, Policy no. 2005-02, effective March 14, 2005, online: Immigration
and Refugee Board of Canada
<http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/references/policy/poicies/exprocess e.htm>. For an evaluation of the
expedited procedure, see Consulting and Audit Canada, Formative Evaluation of the IRB's Streamlining Initiative
(Ottawa: IRB, 2005) (Project No. 520-1035) at 6.
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Table 3: Principal Claimant Refugee Decisions by A.C. Knevel in 2006
Expected
Grant Rate
Decisions Grant Rate Based on IRB
Country OfOrigin (COO) (%) Average for
COO in 2006
______________(%)
Albania 5 40.00 55.41
Antigua and Barbuda I 0.00 0.00
Agentina 3 0.00 12.50
Barbados 1 0.00 40.00
Brazil 5 40.00 17.46
Chile 2 0.00 17.65
Costa Rica I 100.00 10.53
uba 4 50.00 82.69
Grenada 3 0.00 26.92
Guyana 10 30.00 29.01
Ireland 100.00 100.00
amaica 16 37.50 29.91
Mexico 3 66.67 31.22
Philippines 21 14.29 15.66
Poland 2 0.00 10.00
Portugal 6 16.67 2.44
Saint Lucia 20 20.00 23.48
Saint Vincent 20 35.00 36.58
5oralia 5 100.00 93.15
Trinidad & Tobago 8 25.00 24.14
,USA 1 . .o00
total 138 29.71 29.60
It must be acknowledged, then, that the IRB is right to suggest that differen-
tial grant rates among adjudicators are due, in part, to patterns in the types of cases
assigned to particular Board Members. However, this article will show that the data
nonetheless suggests that this is not the whole story.
A. Expedited Claims
First, with respect to the argument regarding expedited claims, the data shows that
strong variations persist even when expedited positive decisions are filtered out of
the analysis. In 2006, the IRB's average grant rate excluding expedited positive claims
was 51.06%, with a standard deviation of 25.24 across individual Board Members.
This is only slightly lower than the average grant rate of 54.08% overall, with a stan-
dard deviation of 26.31. In other words, while expedited claims do have a noticeable
impact on the grant rates of some Board Members and on the overall grant rate at the
IRB, they do not account for a significant proportion of the variance in grant rates
across Board Members. To the contrary, as Table 4 shows, Board Member grant rates
fluctuate dramatically even when expedited claims are excluded.
HeinOnline -- 39 Ottawa L. Rev. 345 2007-2008
OTTAWA LAW REVIEW
39:2
REVUE DE DROIT D'OTTAWA
39:2
Table 4: Five Highest and Lowest Grant Rates (Excluding Expedited Positive Decisions) in
Principal Claimant Refugee Cases in 2006 for IRB Members Deciding at Least 50 Cases
Grant Rate
Board Member Decisions (Excl. Exp.Pos.)
(%)
Lowest Five Houde, Roger 90 6.67
Ghosh, Suparna 119 9.24
Wong, Bing 68 11.76
Freilich, Miriam 123 13.01
Weir, Margaret 128 16.41
Subtotal 528 11.74
Highest Five Pelletier, jean-Paul 81 82.72
Smith-Gordon, Mauree 67 85.07
Lederoq, Dominique 80 91.25
Kitchener, Susan 107 92.52
Ethier, Gilles 138 95.65
Subtotal 473 90.49
Total at IRB in 2006 9984 51.06
B. Regional Specialization
The IRB's second contention, that differential grant rates are a result of regional specializa-
tion by Board Members, also fails to account for the full variations. In fact, the grant rates of
individual Board Members continue to vary significantly, even when the analysis is restrict-
ed to cases involving claimants from particular countries of origin. As Table 5 shows, for
example, grant rates in cases concerning claimants from China, India and Nigeria differ sig-
nificantly among adjudicators who decided the most cases from these countries.
Table 5: Grant Rates of IRB Members Deciding the Largest Number of Principal Claimant
Refugee Cases from Selected Countries of Origin (COO) in 2006
Grant Rate in IRB Average
Decisions Decisions Grant Rate Variationfrom COO from COO for COO (%)
___ __ __ ___ __ __ __ (%) (%) _ _ _
China Pinkney, Thomas 113 82.3 55.22 27,08
Tinker, Diane 108 43.52 55.22 -11.7
Prabhakara, Puttavee 97 51.55 55.22 -3.67
Ellis, Steve 90 31.11 55.22 -24.11
Israel, Milton 82 68.29 55.22 13.07
India Ledercq, Dominique 48 91.67 48.09 43.58
Hamelin, Michael 37 27.03 48.09 -21.06
Pelletier, lean-Paul 27 74.07 48.09 25.99
Crelinsten, Michael 24 37.5 48.09 -10.59
Smith, Diane 18 33.33 48.09 -14.75
Nigeria Kitchener, Susan 47 91.49 41.85 49.64
Sajtos, Joanne 47 27.66 41.85 -14.19
Sandhu, Ken 27 14.81 41.85 -27.03
Savage, Harvey 27 48.15 41.85 6.3
Grewal, Jiti Singh 26 42.31 41.85 0.46
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Along similar lines, Table 6 provides information about the adjudicators with
the largest variance between actual and expected grant rates based on country of ori-
gin. It is worth noting that Table 6 demonstrates not only that there are important
disparities in grant rates that cannot be explained on the basis of regional specializa-
tion, but that these disparities cannot be attributed to expedited claims. In fact, the
table shows that large differences between actual and expected grant rates adjusted
for country of origin are present, regardless of whether expedited positive decisions
are included in the calculations.
Table 6: Ten Extreme Variations Between Actual and Expected Grant Rates Adjusted to
Reflect Country of Origin in Principal Claimant Refugee Claims in 2006 for IRB
Members Deciding at Least 50 Cases
Grant Expected
Grant Rate Expected Grant VariationDecisions Rate (Excl. Grant Rate Variation (Exci.
Member Exp. Rate (Excl. (%) Exp. Pos.)
(%) Pos.) (%) Exp. Pos.) (%)
(%) (%)
Five Wilson,
Extreme Wilbert 72 16.67 16.67 52.24 51.72 -35.58 -35.06
Negative Mckenzie,
Variations Gordon 56 17.86 17.86 53.98 50.97 -36.13 -33.11
Randhawa,
Sarwanjit 84 19.05 19.05 57.9 51.34 -38.85 -32.29
Faure, Michel 59 22.03 22.03 56.41 53.51 -34.38 -31.47
Sandhu, Ken 111 31.53 28.97 60.22 56.46 -28.69 -27.49
Five Smith-
Extreme Gordon,
Positive Mauree 67 85.07 85.07 58.94 58.36 26.13 26.72
Variations Moss, Joel 108 82.41 82.41 51.15 49.86 31.25 32.55
Ethier, Gilles 138 95.65 95.65 62.61 60.69 33.04 34.96
Kitchener,
Susan 107 92.52 92.52 55.63 53.71 36.89 38.81
Ledercq,
Dominique 80 91.25 91.25 53.05 51.75 38.2 39.5
Fotal at IRB in 2006 9984 54.08 51.06 54.08 51.06 N/A N/A
C. Case Type Specialization
It would seem, then, that neither of the two specific explanations offered by the IRB
for the large variations in refugee adjudicator grant rates is borne out by the data.
However, to fully evaluate the IRB's general argument that variations in Board
Member grant rates reflect patterns in case assignment, it is worth testing alternative
explanations for those variations that were not explicitly offered in the letter append-
ed to the IRB's response to the Access to Information Request.
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One alternative explanation 7 presumes that Board Members not only special-
ize in claims from particular countries, but also in specific types of cases from those
countries."8 If the different types of cases have distinct average grant rates, then this
would account for the variation in Board Member grant rates. For example, imagine
that two Board Members hear a large number of unexpedited cases involving
claimants from Mexico. Suppose further that the first Board Member specializes in
cases involving Mexicans alleging a fear of organized criminals or corrupt govern-
ment officials. According to the data obtained through Access to Information proce-
dures, such cases had a grant rate of 23.05% in 2006. Next, hypothesize that the
second Board Member hears a large number of cases involving Mexicans who allege
a fear of domestic violence or other forms of gender based violence. In 2006, such
cases had a grant rate of 46.28%. All other things being equal, the second hypothet-
ical Board Member ought to have a higher grant rate than the first. Table 7 shows sim-
ilar differential average grant rates for particular types of claims from selected
countries of origin, thereby providing some support for this possible explanation for
divergent grant rates.
Table 7: Average IRB Grant Rates in Principal Claimant Refugee Claims in 2006 for
Selected Countries of Origin (COO), Broken Down by Claim Type
Grant Grant Rate
COO Claim Type Decisions Rate (Excl. Exp.
(%) Pos.) (%)
Bangladesh Criminality/ Corruption 7 42.86 42.86
Gender/Domestic 9 33.33 33.33
Nationality/ Ethnidty / Race/ Religion 26 73.08 63.16
Political Activities/Occupations 6 83.33 83.33
Political Organization 78 38.46 38.46
Religion 1 100 100
Subtotal 127 48.03 45
Guyana Criminality/Corruption 86 22.09 22.09
Gender/Domestic 26 46.15 46.15
Nationality / Ethnidty/ Race / Religion 8 25 25
Other 4 25 25
Political Activities/Occupations 5 20 20
Political Organization 27 22.22 22.22
Sexual Orientation 6 100 100
Subtotal 162 29.01 29.01
Ukraine Criminality/ Corruption 25 44 44
Gender/Domestic 59 76.27 75.86
Nationality / Ethnidty/ Race / Religion 24 62.5 60.87
Other 6 50 50
Political Activities/ Occupations 7 14.29 14.29
Political Organization 4 0 0
Sexual Orientation 37 59.46 59.46
_Subtotal 162 59.88 59.38
IRB Total in 2006 9984 54.08 51.06
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This possible explanation nonetheless fails to account for the full variation in
Board Member grant rates. As Table 8 indicates, extreme variations persist between
actual and expected grant rates based on IRB averages for the subset of cases the indi-
vidual Board Members decided, even when these expected grant rates are adjusted
to reflect both country of origin and claim type. It is worth noting that the variations
Table 8: Ten Extreme Variations Between Actual and Expected Grant Rates Adjusted to
Reflect Country of Origin and Claim Type in Principal Claimant Refugee Claims in 2006
for IRB Members Deciding at Least 50 Cases
Grant Expected
Grant Rate Expected Grant VariationBoard Decisions Rate (Excl. Grant Rate Variation (Excl.
Member Exp. Rate (Excl. (%) Exp. Pos.)
( Pos.) (%) Exp. Pos.) (%)
(%) (%)
Five Wilson,
Extreme Wilbert 72 16.67 16.67 51.56 51.05 -34.89 -34.38
Negative Randhawa,
Variations Sarwanjit 84 19.05 19.05 55.09 49.95 -36.04 -30.91
Faure,
Michel 59 22.03 22.03 55.62 52.14 -33.59 -30.1
Houde,
Roger 90 6.67 6.67 34.31 34.22 -27.64 -27.55
Sandhu,
Ken III 31.53 28.97 58.22 53.96 -26.69 -24.99
Five Pelletier,
Extreme ean-Paul 81 82.72 82.72 58.86 56.98 23.85 25.73
Positive Moss, Joel 108 82.41 82.41 51.17 49.92 31.24 32.49
Variations Ethier,
Gilles 138 95.65 95.65 63 61.48 32.65 34.17
Kitchener,
Susan 107 92.52 92.52 59.88 58.29 32.64 34.24
Leclercq,
Dominique 80 91.25 91.25 52.1 50.67 39.15 40.58
kotal at IRB in 2006 9984 54.08 51.06 54.08 51.06 N/A N/A
37. This explanation was offered by the IRB in a response a newspaper article setting out a preliminary version
of the statistics outlined in this article. See Benoit Chiquette, Director of Communications, IRB, News
Release, "Letter to the Editor of theToronto Star dated August 30, 2007 concerning the Ideas page of August
29, 2007" online: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
<http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/media/news/2007/starO70830_e.htm>. See also Sean Rehaag,
"Adjudication lottery for refugees" The Toronto Star (30 Aug 2007) A8.
38. IRB Letter, supra note 28, which states that the IRB's internal database categorises cases into 17 different
claim types: (1) Age/Health, (2) Criminality/Corruption, (3) Gender, (4) Gender/DomesticViolence, (5)
Military Service, (6) Nationality/ Ethnicity/Race, (7) Nationality/Ethnicity/Race/Religion, (8) Non-
Specific Persecution, (9) Other, (10) Other State Policy Issues, (I1) Political Activism, (12) Political
Activities/Occupations, (13) Political Organization, (14) Prosecution, (15) Religions, (16) Sexual
Orientation, and (17) State. A number of these categories partly overlap, and thus categorization of particu-
lar cases will inevitably be imprecise. However, for present purposes it is sufficient to note that, to the
extent that case type is a relevant consideration in the assignment of cases to particular Board Members,
such assignment will reflect the way in which the IRB classifies the cases in these 17 categories.
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listed in Table 8 are slightly lower than the variations between actual and expected
grant rates adjusted to reflect only country of origin as set out in Table 6. For
instance, the variance between Wilbert Wilson's actual and expected grant rate
adjusted for country of origin was 35.58%, whereas the discrepancy between his
actual and expected grant rate adjusted for both country of origin and claim type was
34.89%. However, it is important to appreciate that the differences between the vari-
ations listed in Table 6 and 8 are very small. In other words, while claim type spe-
cialization may be a contributing factor to differential grant rates among Board
Members, it is not a particularly significant one.39
D. Variations Across IRB Offices
There is another possible explanation for grant rate variation related to patterns in case
assignment that was not explicitly put forward by the IRB. This explanation is that
adjudicators in different IRB offices in Canada40 encounter subsets of refugee claimants
with distinct attributes that are not captured by statistics broken down merely by
country of origin or claim type. For example, refugee claimants may settle dispropor-
tionately in particular regions of Canada by virtue of factors such as racial, family, eco-
nomic or political ties and networks. Since these factors may have an impact on
refugee claimants' experiences of persecution in their home countries, patterns in
regional settlement may produce understandable variations in grant rates among adju-
dicators in different IRB offices who hear otherwise apparently similar cases. 4'
Such an explanation arguably finds some support through significant variations
between average and country specific grant rates across IRB offices. As Table 9 indi-
cates, in 2006, there were noticeable variations in the average grant rates across the
five IRB offices, with the Calgary office having the lowest grant rate (46.76%), and
the Vancouver office having the highest grant rate (54.38%). Table 10 breaks down
the statistics further, demonstrating that the grant rates in cases involving refugee
claimants from major source countries, including China and India, fluctuated quite
significantly across IRB offices.
39. These differences may also reflect the greater influence of a single Board Member's decisions on the average grant
rates for the relatively small subsets of cases involving particular claim types for specific countries of origin.
40. The IRB maintains 5 offices: Atlantic, Calgary, Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver.
41. A former IRB Chairperson offers an example of such possible variations: "For example, in the past year,
the majority of the claimants arriving on the West Coast from the People's Republic of China (PRC) were
from Fujian province, while the majority of PRC claimants in the Toronto office were from Tibet where
there is a significant documentary record of human rights abuses by the state," Showier, supra note 17 at
"Remedial Initiatives."
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Table 10: Grant Rates in Principle Claimant Refugee Cases in 2006 From Selected
Countries of Origin (COO), Broken Down by IRB Office
Grant Rate Grant Rate (Excl.COO IRB Office Decisions (%) Exp. Pos.)
Atlantic 0 N/A N/A
Calgary 4 75.00 75.00
China Montreal 13 53.85 53.85
Toronto 1011 55.59 55.59
Vancouver 102 50.98 50.00
Total 1130 55.22 55.14
Atlantic 0 N/A N/A
Calgary 8 25.00 25.00
India Montreal 216 58.80 58.60
Toronto 101 35.64 35.64
Vancouver 41 26.83 26.83
Total 366 48.09 47.95
Atlantic 8 12.50 12.50
Calgary 8 0.00 0.00
Mexico Montreal 614 31.92 31.81
Toronto 448 30.13 30.13
Vancouver 72 37.50 37.50
Total 1150 31.22 31.16
iotal at IRB in 2006 9984 54.08 51.06
As Table 11 shows, however, the variations in grant rates across adjudicators
within particular IRB offices were more pronounced than variations in grant rates
across IRB offices.Thus, for example, in cases involving Chinese claimants inToronto,
Thomas Pinkney (82.30%) granted refugee status far more frequently than Diane
Tinker (43.5 2%). This demonstrates that the effect of regional settlement patterns
among refugee claimants-like the other explanations thus far canvassed-fails to
adequately account for the sharp variations in the grant rates of individual Canadian
refugee adjudicators.
Table 9: Grant Rates at IRB Offices in Principal
Claimant Refugee Claims in 2006
Grant
RateIRB w . Grant Rate (Exci.
IRB Office Decisions rn ae (xl(%) Exp.
Pos.)
_________ __________ (%)
Atlantic 90 48.89 47.73
Calgary 278 46.76 44.98
Montreal 2934 54.43 50.28
Toronto 6191 54.29 51.55
Vancouver 491 54.38 53.53
Total 9984 54.08 51.06
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Table 11: Grant Rates of 4 Board Members in Selected IRB Offices Deciding the Largest
Number of Principal Claimant Refugee Cases From Selected Countries of Origin (COO) in
2006
Grant Grant Rate
COO IRB Office Board Member Decisions Rate (Exc. Exp.N Pos.)
Beckow, Stephen Mark 43 41.86 41.86
French, Susan 16 81.25 81.25
Vancouver Hitchcock, Fred 11 72.73 72.73
Pattee, Ross 9 33.33 33.33
Total (Vancouver) 102 50.98 50.00
China Pinkney, Thomas 113 82.30 82.30
inker, Diane 108 43.52 43.52
Toronto Prabhakara, Puttavee 97 51.55 51.55
Ellis, Steve 90 31.11 31.11
Total (Toronto) 1011 55.59 55.59
Total (all offices) 1130 55.22 55.14
Ledercq, Dominique 48 91.67 91.67
Hamelin, Michael 37 27.03 27.03
Montreal Pelletier, Jean-Paul 27 74.07 74.07
Crelinsten, Michael 24 37.50 37.50
India Total (Montreal) 216 58.80 58.60
Smith, Diane 18 33.33 33.33
Fraser, Gayle 15 6.67 6.67
Toronto Makonnen, Yilna 12 58.33 58.33
Railton, James 12 16.67 16.67
Total (Toronto) 101 35.64 35.64
Total (all offices) 366 48.09 47.95
Total at IRB in 2006 9984 54.08 51.06
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
This article has shown that, according to data obtained through Access to Information
procedures, there are vast variations in the grant rates of Canadian refugee adjudica-
tors. The article has also shown that the grant rates of particular refugee adjudicators
appear to be influenced by the number of expedited claims adjudicators are assigned,
by regional and claim type specialization, as well as by the IRB office to which Board
Members belong. However, while these factors may influence grant rates, they fail to
offer a full account of the dramatic grant rate disparities. A number of tentative
observations are in order.
A. Extraneous Factors in Refugee Adjudication
First, a reasonable inference to draw from this data is that the vast unexplained vari-
ations in Board Member grant rates are a result of factors other than patterns in case
assignment, likely factors related to the personal characteristics of particular Board
Members. Further empirical studies are warranted both to verify this inference and
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to determine exactly what types of personal traits best account for the divergent
rates. Factors that are available through public sources and that would be particular-
ly interesting to measure in future research include: the political party of appoint-
ment; the length of time served on the IRB; whether the adjudicator has legal
training; prior professional positions occupied (i.e. refugee lawyer, civil servant,
etc.); country of origin; first language; visible minority affiliations; and gender.
It is worth noting that there is a small but growing body of empirical scholar-
ship that measures the influence of various personal characteristics of judges on adju-
dicative outcomes. 42 Thus far, most such scholarship in Canada has concentrated on
appellate level decisions. 43 Among the most comprehensive empirical analyses of the
effects of the personal characteristics of judges on Canadian adjudication is a recent
study by James Stribopoulos & MoinYahya." Their study compares the influence of
two factors on Ontario Court of Appeal outcomes: the gender and the party of
appointment of the judges hearing appeals. According to their analysis, "as between
the two variables, gender may matter more than party of appointment . . . .Most
interestingly, there appears to be greater cohesiveness in the decisions of judges of the
same gender than in those from the same party of appointment."45
At present, no similar studies have been undertaken in the context of
Canadian refugee adjudication. However, a recent large-scale empirical study has
examined various levels of US refugee adjudication along these lines.46 Along with
other data considered, the study examines 140,428 asylum applications decided in
US Immigration Court from January 2000 to August 2004.17 These are examples of
the more pertinent findings of the study:
42. See e.g. Glendon A. Schubert, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959);
Sheldon Goldman, "Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited" (1975) 69 American
Political Science Review 491; Deborah I. Barrow, Gary Zuk & Gerard S. Gryski, The Federa)Judiciary and
Institutional Change (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996);Theodore W. Ruger et al., "The
Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court
Decisionmaking" (2004) 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1150; Russell Smyth, "Explaining Voting Patterns on the
Latham High Court 1935-50" (2002) 26 Melbourne U.L. Rev 88; Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa
Michelle ElIman, "Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation" (2004) 90
Va. L. Rev. 301.
43. Sidney Raymond Peck, "A Behavioural Approach to the Judicial Process: Scalogram Analysis" (1967) 5
Osgoode Hall L.I. I ;Thaddeus Hwong, "A Review of Quantitative Studies of Decision Making in the
Supreme of Canada" (2003) 30 Man. L.J. 353; Sujit Choudhry & Claire E. Hunter, "Measuring Judicial
Activism on the Supreme Court of Canada: A Comment on Nenfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE" (2003) 48
McGill L.I. S25; Peter. McCormick, "The Choral Court: Separate Concurrence and the McLachlin Court,
2000-2004" (2005-2006) 37 Ottawa L. Rev. I.
44. James Stribopoulos & Moin A.Yahya,"Does a Judge's Party of Appointment or Gender Matter to Case
Outcomes?: An Empirical Study of the Court of Appeal for Ontario" (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 315.
45. Ibid. at 353.
46. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Phillip G. Schrag, "Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum
Adjudication" (2007) 60 Stan. L. Rev. 295.
47. Ibid. at 394-395.
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Female Immigration Court judges had significantly higher grant rates (53.8%)
than male judges (37.3%);48
Immigration Court judges who had never worked previously for Immigration
and Naturalization Services (INS) or the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) had higher grant rates (48.2%) than those who had worked for these
government agencies for 1-5 years (42.9%), for 6-10 years (40.2%) or for
II or more years (31.3%); and,49
Grant rates varied depending on whether Immigration Court judges had prior
work experience with the military (37.4%), INS or DNS (38.9%), the gov-
ernment (excluding INS or DNS) (39.6%), private legal practice (46.3%),
academia (52.3%), and/or not-for-profit organizations (55.4%).50
Taken together, the authors of the study conclude:
Whether an asylum applicant is able to live safely in the United States or is deported to a
country in which he claims to fear persecution is very seriously influenced by a spin of
the wheel of chance; that is, by a clerk's random assignment of an applicant's case to one
asylum officer rather than another, or one immigration judge rather than another.
51
Another promising research avenue-in addition to undertaking similar
large-scale multi-year empirical analysis to measure outcomes in Canadian refugee
adjudication against publicly discernable personal characteristics of refugee
adjudicators-would involve structured interviews with Board Members. The infor-
mation compiled through interviews could then be indexed against data regarding the
cases decided by the interviewed Board Members. While such a study would require
the permission of the IRB, it would be in the interest of the IRB to participate vol-
untarily. Indeed, such a study would offer the IRB invaluable information about how
to best design its screening procedures for appointees. Moreover, it would also help
the IRB to identify further opportunities for refugee adjudicator training and other
procedures designed to increase consistency in decision-making.
Franyois Cr~peau, Delphine Nakache and Janet Cleveland have recently con-
ducted interviews with several former Board Members that provide an approximation
of what such a study might indicate.52 According to the interviewed former Board
Members, there are many personal characteristics that significantly influence the
decision-making process of refugee adjudicators. These characteristics include general
qualities, such as empathy, open-mindedness, cross-cultural sensitivity, lucidity and
48. Ibid. at 342.
49. Ibid. at 347.
50. Ibid. at 345-46.
51. Ibid. at 378.
52. Crepeau & Nakache, supra note 18.
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common sense. One particularly frequently cited factor was the way in which differ-
ent Board Members understand their institutional role as refugee adjudicators.
According to the former Board Members, some adjudicators see their role as giving
effect to Canada's international human rights obligations. Such adjudicators reported-
ly err on the side of caution, in that, when they are uncertain as to whether a claimant
meets the refugee definition, they accord refugee protection in order to avoid the pos-
sibility of erroneously returning someone to a country where they face persecution.
Therefore, these adjudicators would presumably have above average refugee grant
rates. Other Board Members, however, reportedly see their role as protecting the
integrity of Canadian border control processes, and in particular, shielding the refugee
determination systems against fraudulent claims. For such Board Members, detecting
falsehood-especially by discerning discrepancies between refugee claimant testimo-
ny and documentary evidence-is the primary aim of refugee hearings. It seems like-
ly that such adjudicators have disproportionately low grant rates.5"
Unfortunately, without an interdisciplinary study that identifies these and
other personal characteristics of Board Members, and then indexes such characteris-
tics against outcomes in refugee adjudication, it is difficult to empirically evaluate
these observations made by former Board Members. The first major implication of
the data presented in this article, then, is that a larger multi-year empirical study of
IRB adjudication is warranted.
B. The IRB Appointments Process
A second key implication of the data obtained through Access to Information proce-
dures is that, because the identity of Board Members appears to be an important fac-
tor in refugee claim outcomes, the process through which Board Members are
appointed must be carefully scrutinized.
Because the IRB is Canada's largest administrative tribunal, 4 IRB appoint-
ments provide frequent occasions for political patronage. Such patronage allows the
governing political party to fill important positions of authority with those who share
the party's outlook, and to reward those faithful to the party with relatively high paid
government posts.5 Political patronage in IRB appointments has long proven to be
53. Ibid.
54. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, IRB Report on Plans and Policies 2002-2003, Estimates, online:Treasury
Board of Canada Secretariat <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/est-pre/20022003/irb-cisr/IRBO203rppOl-e.asp>
("Created by an Act of Parliament in 1989, the IRB is the largest administrative tribunal" at 22).
55. Current salaries for Board Members are in the range of $95,500-$ 112,300, according to Immigration and
Refugee Board of Canada, "Statement of Qualifications for IRB GIC Members" online: Immigration and
Refugee Board of Canada <http:/ /www.irl-cisr.gc.ca/en/about/employment/members/soqe.htm>.
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highly controversial.5 6 As far back as 1990, for example, the Canadian Bar Association
(CBA) decried the political considerations at play in IRB appointments. According to
the CBA, when administrative tribunals such as the IRB engage in decision-making
processes that are similar in principle to those employed in adjudicative institutions,
the members of these administrative tribunals should not be selected on the basis of
their political orientations or connections.57
In recent years, some steps have been taken towards reducing the role of polit-
ical patronage in IRB appointments.58 In March of 2004, responding to concerns
expressed in an Auditor General's Report regarding the quality of IRB appointees,59
the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration announced reforms to the appointment
process. The new procedure involved two separate advisory bodies, one internal and
one external to the IRB. The Chair of the IRB and the Minister jointly named the
members of the external body, which was meant to be "independent and representa-
tive of Canadians."6 This body, known as the Advisory Panel, was responsible for ini-
tial screening of applications. Once the Advisory Panel vetted candidates, their
qualifications were then scrutinized further by the internal body, known as the
Selection Board. The Chair of the IRB named the members of the Selection Board,
who were to be "experts with an in-depth understanding of the IRB and its decision-
making processes."6' The role of the Selection Board was to provide the Minister with
a list of "highly qualified candidates '62 for IRB appointments. The Minister then exer-
cised discretion over who, among those candidates, would receive appointments.
Initial reaction to the new process was mixed. 63 Some, including the Chair of
the IRB, publicly lauded the new appointments procedure as a dramatic improvement
56. See e.g. Lorne Waldman, "Political patronage is bad-and dangerous too" The Toronto Star (17 October
1990) A25;T. Godfrey, "Board Reform Urged" The Toronto Star (20 June 1994) A25; Norm Doyle, "Tory MP
wants review of patronage appointments to IRB" The Hill Times (2 February 1998) 21; Allan Thompson,
"Refugee board under fire for political appointments" The Toronto Star (14 June 2003) HI.
57. Report of the Canadian Bar Association Task Force on the Independence of Federal Administrative Tribunals and Agencies
in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1990) at 60.
58. For a systemic review of the history of politicized IRB appointments, as well as a discussion of recent efforts
to reform the appointment process, see Crkpeau & Nakache, supra note 18.
59. 1997 December Report of the Auditor General of Canada (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada,
1997), ss. 25.61-25.70, online: Office of the Auditor General of Canada <http:/ /www oag-
bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/aud ch oag_ 997_25_e 8111 .html>. See especially s. 25.70: "The govern-
ment should ensure that the selection process for Board members provides greater certainty that
appointments or reappointments to the Immigration and Refugee Board are based on the qualifications
needed to respond to the complexity and the importance of the task."
60. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Backgrounder, "Reform of the Immigration and Refugee Board's
Governor in Council appointment process" (16 March 2004), online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada
<http: / /www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/backgrounders/2004/200"4O3-1 6.asp>.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. See generally Cristin Schmitz, "Reform of IRB appointments gets mixed reception from Bar" The Lawyers
Weekly (26 March 2004) 23:44 at I.
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upon the prior practice. 6 Other commentators criticized the new process on the
grounds that it left avenues open for the Minister to make political decisions regard-
ing appointments, as well as regarding the members of the Advisory Board.65
More recently, however, the new appointment process has drawn criticism for
providing too little room for Ministerial input into the initial screening process. Most
notably, a 2007 report, prepared for the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration by
the Public Appointments Commission Secretariat, recommended that the Minister
have more involvement in the early stages of candidate screening.66 According to the
report, "Itihe Minister . .. [has] a direct and legitimate interest in both the appoint-
ment process and in the development of the lists of potential IRB Members which are
provided for their consideration .... "61 Taking this interest to heart, the Report rec-
ommended that the two advisory bodies be merged, and that the Minister directly
appoint at least half of the members of the newly merged body.6
In July 2007, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration announced the
merger of the Advisory Panel and the Selection Board into a single body. This new
body is composed of the Chair of the IRB, three members selected by the Chair, and
three members from outside the IRB selected jointly by the Minister and the Chair.69
Refugee advocates immediately decried this announcement as amounting to "a dis-
couraging repoliticization of the selection process."70 This objection was perhaps
unsurprising, considering that when the recommendations were first put forward,
the Canadian Bar Association warned:
Given the IRB's history of rampant patronage in the very recent past, it is imperative that
nothing be done to permit it to gain a new toehold. If the minister appoints any of the
external members of the committee screening IRB board members, it will inevitably lead
to an increased public perception that patronage, not merit, plays a role in the appoint-
64. See Jean-Guy Fleury, Chairperson of the IRB, "CISR: un nouveau processus de s~lection pour des candidats
hautement qualifies," Letter to the Editor, Le Devoir (10 April 2004) B4.
65. See France Houle & Franqois Crepeau, "La proposition Sgro ne mettra pas fin au patronage: Le gouverne-
ment doit cesser de participer la selection des commissaires" Le Devoir (7 April 2004) A9: "D'une part, il
est encore loisible au gouvernement d'y nommer des personnes ayant des liens etroits avec lui .... D'autre
part, on ne precise pas le nombre de personnes qui si~geront A ce comitY: le ministre peut s'assurer qu'il
sera domin6 par une majoritd de personnes qui auront une trs bonne comprehension des r~alites gouverne-
mentales."
66. Public Appointments Commission Secretariat, Governor in Council Appointments Process-Immigration and
Rcfugee Board of Canada (Ottawa: Public Appointments Commission Secretariat, 2007) online: Citizenship
and Immigration Canada <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/irb-process.asp#a7>.
67. Ibid. at "Recommendation 4."
68. Ibid. at "Recommendation 4,""Recommendation 5."
69. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, News Release, "Minister Finley announces revised selection process for
appointments to the IRB" (9 July 2007), online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada
<http:/ /www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2007/2007-07- 0 9 .asp>.
70. Email from Janet Dench, Executive Director, Canadian Council for Refugees, to the Canadian Council for
Refugees Listserv (9 July 2007) "Revised IRB Selection Process" [on file with authorl.
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ment process, thereby undoing the efforts of the 2004 reforms. The injection of political
considerations by even one of the members may disturb the deliberations of the selection
committee, which has operated on the basis of consensus for the past three years.
71
These debates over the IRB Member appointment process show that one
major challenge in establishing an appointments procedure is to strike the proper bal-
ance between democratic accountability and Ministerial responsibility for executive
appointments, on the one hand, and ensuring the competence and impartiality of IRB
appointees, on the other hand. If the ongoing debates regarding the appointment
process are to occur in an informed manner, however, the fact that refugee grant rates
vary dramatically across Board Members is an important consideration.
Of course, the existence of the variations alone is not necessarily determina-
tive of the appropriate role of political actors in the IRB appointment process. Some
might suggest, for example, that if the varying Board Member grant rates are reflec-
tive of the personal characteristics of Board Members-and in particular of their
views regarding the proper institutional role of refugee adjudicators-then the
appointment process ought to enhance the accountability of IRB adjudicators to
Parliament. In other words, if refugee determination is a largely political exercise,
that exercise ought to be subject to heightened democratic control.
Others, however, may draw the opposite conclusion from large variations in
refugee adjudicator grant rates. Such observers may suggest that it is essential to
redouble efforts to develop an appointment process that eschews political consider-
ations and that instead seeks out the most highly qualified and competent adjudica-
tors, thereby encouraging the IRB to develop an institutional culture of adjudicative
independence.
The second major implication of the data presented in this study, then, is not
that wide disparities in refugee grant rates necessarily support one side or another in
the ongoing debates on the IRB appointments process. Rather, it is that both sides in
these debates ought to address the disparities in IRB Member grant rates and set out
what they view as an appropriate response.
C. The Refugee Appeal Division
A third implication of the data presented in this study is that it is essential to rethink
a troubling feature of the existing refugee determination process. Currently, a single
adjudicator is responsible for making factual findings that determine whether a
refugee claimant is entitled to refugee protection-factual findings that are difficult
to have reviewed on their merits in the event of error.
71. Submissions to Government, Letter to Citizenship and Immigration Committee by lean-Philippe Brunet,
Chair, National Citizenship and Immigration Section, Canadian Bar Association (16 Apr 2007), online: The
Canadian Bar Association <http: / / www.cba.org/cba/submissions/2007eng/O 7 22 .aspx>.
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Prior to Canada's current immigration legislation, passed in 2001, refugee
claims were heard by two Board Members. Only one Board Member had to be per-
suaded in order for the claimant to secure refugee protection. 2 However, under the
current immigration legislation, single Board Member panels now hear the vast
majority of refugee claims.7"
The data presented in this article raises concerns about the shift from double
to single Board Member refugee adjudication. The fact that the identity of Board
Members appears to be a major determinant of refugee claim outcomes suggests that
the prior practice of two Board Member panels offered refugee claimants important
(although admittedly limited) protection against having their claims erroneously
denied, simply because the assigned adjudicator had extremely low grant rates. For
this to occur under the old system, claimants would have had to be extremely
unlucky and be assigned two Board Members with low grant rates. Moreover, IRB
management could limit the harm done by adjudicators with especially low grant
rates by matching them with more moderate adjudicators.7 4 Under the new single
Board Member system, however, these protections are no longer available.
The problematic move from double to single Board Member refugee adjudi-
cation was initially justified75 on the basis of another change in the new legislation:
the establishment of a procedure through which initial refugee determinations may
be appealed on their merits to the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) of the IRB.7 6
However, when the government brought the new legislation into force in 2002, it
selectively implemented the legislation. In particular, all of the provisions of the leg-
islation were brought into force except those pertaining to the RAD 7 Successive
governments have continued to indefinitely delay the implementation of the RAD1 8
72. Catherine Dauvergne, "Evaluating Canada's New Immigration and Reifugee Protection Act in its Global Context"
(2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 725 at 728.
73. IRPA, supra note 4, s. 163.
74. There is some evidence that this was, in fact, the practice. See Cr6peau & Nakache, supra note 18, stating
that according to a former Board Member, "Itlhey used to divide members into two categories: you are
either weak or strong. They would often put a weak member with a strong member .... The weak member
is the one who can be influenced negative [sicl."
75. House of Commons Debates, No.021 (26 Feb 2001) (Hon. Elinor Caplan) ("IBly combining increased use of sin-
gle member panels at the board with an internal paper appeal on merit, we will see faster but fairer deci-
sions on refugee claims." at 1171).
76. IRPA, supra note 4, ss. I 10- 11, 171.
77. Order FixingJune 28, 2002 as the Date of the Coming into Force of Certain Provisions of the Act, SI/2002-97, C.
Gaz. 1997.11.1637.The government's purported legal authority for selective implementation flows from the
vague boilerplate Coming Into Force provision of the legislation: IRPA, supra note 4, s. 275 states, "The pro-
visions of this Act come into force on a day or days to be fixed by order of the Governor in Council."
lemphasis addedi.
78. At the time of writing, a Private Members' Bill that would immediately implement the RAD has passed in
the House of Commons, and is currently under consideration in the Senate. Bill C-280, An Act to amend the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (coming into force of sections 110, 111 and 171), Ist Sess., 39th Parl., 2007
(as passed by the House of Commons 30 May 2007).
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Of course, even absent the RAD, it remains possible to apply for leave from
the Federal Court to have a negative IRB refugee determination judicially reviewed.7 9
However, leave is granted infrequently. In 2001, for example, leave was granted in
only 12% of cases where it was requested.8 0 Moreover, in the few refugee determi-
nations that are subject to judicial review, courts are highly reluctant to overturn fac-
tual findings based on an adjudicator's firsthand evaluation of the credibility of
testimony8'-which is usually a major factor in the case of refugee determinations.8 2
However, it is worth highlighting one interesting avenue through which judi-
cial review could be deployed, in principle, to correct alleged errors in refugee deter-
minations made by Board Members with disproportionately low grant rates. This
possibility would be to not merely challenge the substance of factual findings made in
the initial refugee hearing, but also to allege a reasonable apprehension of bias based
on statistical evidence of the refugee adjudicator's low grant rates."3 Indeed, there is
some case law indicating that courts may be amenable to considering statistical evi-
dence regarding refugee claim grant rates.8 4 It is important to note, however, that
inferring a reasonable apprehension of bias would only be appropriate in scenarios
where Board Members have extremely low grant rates.8 5 Moreover, the government
79. IRPA, supra note 4, s. 72.
80. Department of Justice Canada, Immigration and Refugee Legal Aid Cost Drivers: Final Report by John Frecker
(Ottawa: Legal Aid Research Series, 2002) at 84.
81. Singh, supra note 10 at para. 59: "Appellate courts are well aware of the inherent weakness of written tran-
scripts where questions of credibility are at stake and thus are extremely loath to review the findings of tri-
bunals which have had the benefit of hearing the testimony of witnesses in person."
82. Jones & Baglay, supra note 4 at 240 states: "In the majority of cases the turning point in determining whether
or not to grant protection is the credibility of the claimant."
83. The basic test for reasonable apprehension of bias was set out in CommitteeforJustice and Liberty r. National
Energy Board, 119781 I S.C.R. 369 at 394, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 716 INational Energy Board cited to S.C.R.]:
ITIhe apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right minded persons,
applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information.... [Tihat test is
"what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically-and having thought
the matter through-conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision- makerl,
whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly.
84. Canadian Councilfor Refugees v. R., 2007 FC 1262 at para. 152; Geza, supra note 23 at para. 39; Arrarhch v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 999, 299 F.T.R. I at paras. 6-7; Nartey v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1994) 74 F.T.R. 74 (F.C.T.D.) at para. 7. See also Nyembo v. The
Refugee Appeals Tribunal and James Nicholson, [20071 IESC 25.
85. Extremely low grant rates may not only indicate inconsistencies in adjudication, but also suggest that the
Board Member is not rationally adjudicating cases in accordance with the authorizing legislation. This distinc-
tion is important because the Supreme Court has held that judicial review cannot be used to correct mere
inconsistencies between adjudicators at administrative tribunals. Ellis-Don Limited r. Ontario (Labour Relations
Board), 2001 SCC 4,120011 1 S.C.R. 211 at para. 28, 194 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [Ellis-Don cited to S.C.R.]:
[Einsuring the consistency of decisions of administrative bodies or tribunals was not a proper function of
judicial review by superior courts. Inconsistencies or conflicts between different decisions of the same
tribunal would not be reason to intervene, provided the decisions themselves remained within the core
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunals and within the bounds of rationality. It [isi on the shoulders of
the administrative bodies themselves to develop the procedures needed to ensure a modicum of consis-
tency between its adjudicators or divisions.
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should have the opportunity to refute this alleged reasonable apprehension of bias by
presenting convincing evidence that the low grant rates of the particular Board
Members in question are reasonable in light of the subset of cases they decided.
While this possibility is certainly worth pursuing, given the limits on judicial
review,8 it remains the case that there are currently no means to consistently correct
erroneous refugee determinations made by single Board Member panels at the IRB.
A major implication of the data presented in this article, then, is that the massive dis-
parities in grant rates of refugee adjudicators offer further support for immediately
implementing the RAD. To be sure, concerns about the consistency of adjudication
across Board Members would persist even if the appeal were implemented. In par-
ticular, sharp variations in grant rates among Board Members hearing appeals would,
if anything, amplify the problem. However, this concern could be addressed, in prin-
ciple, by appointing to the RAD only experienced Board Members with moderate
and consistent track records.8 7
VIII. CONCLUSION
Using new data obtained through formal Access to Information procedures, this study
has demonstrated that refugee claim grant rates fluctuated dramatically across indi-
vidual IRB adjudicators in 2006. Some Board Members granted refugee status in vir-
tually all the cases they heard; others granted refugee status rarely, if at all. Moreover,
this study has also shown that, contrary to the arguments put forward by the IRB, pat-
terns in case assignment do not fully account for the grant rate variations. Rather, the
identity of Board Members assigned to particular claims appears to be an important
factor in refugee claim outcomes.
This conclusion regarding grant rate variations makes it imperative that fur-
ther empirical studies be undertaken to determine precisely what aspects of adjudi-
cator identities most strongly influence refugee claim outcomes. Furthermore, the
procedures through which adjudicators are appointed to the IRB should be scruti-
nized in light of grant rate disparities. Finally, dramatic grant rate discrepancies offer
86. See text accompanying notes 79-82.
87. For further discussions about the implementation of the RAD, see Stacey A. Saufert, "Closing the Door to
Refugees: The Denial of Due Process for Refugee Claimants in Canada" (2007) 70 Sask. L. Rev. 27;
Dauvergne, supra note 72 at 733; Franmois Cr~peau, Delphine Nakache & Idil Atak, "International Migration:
Security Concerns and Human Rights Standards" (2007) 44Transcultural Psychiatry 311 at 319-320;
Canadian Council for Refugees, supra note 9; Amnesty International Canada, "Canada: Refugees-No
recourse to fair appeal" (21 March 2006), online: Amnesty International Canada
<http: / / www.amnesty.ca/take-action/actions/canada-fairappeal.php>; Letter from Judith Kumin,
UNHCR Representative in Canada, to Minister Coderre, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (9 May
2002), online: CCR <http://www.ccrweb.ca/RADpage/PAGE0004.HTM>.
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further support for reconsidering the move in 2002 from dual to single adjudicator
refugee hearings, and for the immediate implementation of the Refugee Appeal
Division set out in Canada's current immigration legislation.
Refugee determinations literally involve life and death decisions. False nega-
tive determinations can lead to refugees being deported to countries where they face
persecution, torture or worse. The data presented in this study on Canadian refugee
adjudication gives serious cause for concern about how these deeply significant deci-
sions are currently being made.
APPENDIX I
Variations Between Actual and Expected Grant Rates Adjusted to Reflect Country of Origin
(COO) in Principal Claimant Refugee Cases in 2006
Expected
Expected Grant
Grant Grant Rate
Grant Rate Rate Based on Variation
Board Member Exp. Pos. Decisions Rate (Excl. Based on IRB Variation (Excl.Decisions Exp. IRB Average (%) Exp._Pos.)
N Pos.) Average for COO (%)
(%) for COO (Excl.
(%) Exp. Pos.)
(%)
Ahlfeld, Pamila 5 95 60,00 57,78 60,53 55,61 -0,53 2,16
Ali Khan, Azhar 50 64,00 64,00 62,04 59,44 1,96 4,56
Alidina, Shamshuddin 107 65,42 65,42 64,47 64,02 0,95 1,40
Allegra, Giovanna 22 44 84,09 68,18 64,83 50,96 19,26 17,22
Archambault, Donal 135 40,00 40,00 54,97 54,25 -14,97 -14,25
ArmstronpMarnie 88 68,18 68,18 56,95 53,40 11,24 14,78
Arvanitakis, Denis 39 15,38 15,38 50,13 48,50 -34,75 -33,12
Ayorech, Benjamin 59 42,37 42,37 58,19 55,01 -15,81 -12,64
3- Duque, Jeannine 1 0,00 0,00 29,41 29,41 -29,41 -29,41
Beaubien- Duque, Jean I 28 21,43 18,52 57,41 55,09 -35,98 -36,58
Beauquier, Jean- Pier 49 50 100,00 100,00 79,92 55,66 20,08 44,34
3eckow, Stephen Mark 93 43,01 43,01 52,41 51,76 -9,40 -8,75
Bedard, Joanna 82 46,34 46,34 65,36 64,36 -19,02 -18,02
Berger, Barbara 88 45,45 45,45 62,34 59,16 -16,89 -13,70
Berry, Clifford 125 56,80 56,80 58,29 57,21 -1,49 -0,41
Brennenstuhl, Keith 64 71,88 71,88 62,49 61,10 9,38 10,77
3udaci, Stephen 94 46,81 46,81 58,56 57,03 -11,75 -10,22
Case, Complex 38 71,05 71,05 64,32 61,41 6,73 9,65
Chakkalakal, Jetty 71 80,28 80,28 65,11 64,30 15,17 15,98
Chevrier, Marie 4 67 58,21 55,56 58,83 56,09 -0,62 -0,54
Collison, Don 1 0,00 0,00 33,33 33,33 -33,33 -33,33
Cooke, David E. 137 51,82 51,82 31,09 30,23 20,74 21,59
Costa, Ana 11 37 64,86 50,00 62,38 55,63 2,48 -5,63
Crelinsten, Michael 66 42,42 42,42 49,94 46,64 -7,52 -4,22
Cropley, Laurel _ 42 50,00 50,00 56,46 56,05 -6,46 -6,05
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Cunningham, Joan 64 73,44 73,44 55,74 55,21 17,70 18,23
Dauns, Paulah 7 12 75,00 40,00 58,29 40,59 16,71 -0,59
Davis, William 64 67,19 67,19 54,95 53,37 12,24 13,82
Dawson, Richard 33 41 80,49 0,00 66,22 2,44 14,27 -2,44
Dawsonx, Richard 29 30 100,00 100,00 77,19 70,00 22,81 30,00
Del Nelro, Luciano 22 86,36 86,36 32,31 32,26 54,06 54,11
Delisle, Ruth 101 45,54 45,54 62,81 59,98 -17,27 -14,43
Derousseau, Tita 10 39 48,72 31,03 60,14 55,66 -11,42 -24,62
Diallo, Lamine 6 66,67 66,67 68,07 65,84 -1,40 0,82
Ellis, Steve 130 43,08 43,08 55,42 54,52 -12,35 - 11,45
Ethier, Gilles 138 95,65 95,65 62,61 60,69 33,04 34,96
Faure, Michel 59 22,03 22,03 56,41 53,51 -34,38 -31,47
Fecteau, Diane 52 34,62 34,62 56,49 55,60 -21,87 -20,99
Fleury, jean Guy 1 100,00 100,00 55,22 55,14 44,78 44,86
Forbes, Cathryn 66 60,61 60,61 55,26 54,80 5,35 5,81
Forsey, Dian 55 34,55 34,55 47,21 46,60 -12,67 -12,05
Fortier, Jacques W. 19 47,37 47,37 58,76 57,93 -11,39 -10,56
Fournier, Lloyd 95 47,37 47,37 54,28 52,49 -6,91 -5,12
Fraser, Gayle 92 43,48 43,48 55,61 53,70 -12,13 -10,22
Freeman, Kathleen 1 77 57,14 56,58 51,44 50,64 5,70 5,94
Freilich, Miriam 123 13,01 13,01 31,07 29,92 -18,07 -16,92
French, Susan 1 72 76,39 76,06 55,50 54,49 20,89 21,57
Ghosh, Suparna _ 119 9,24 9,24 32,81 31,59 -23,57 -22,34
Gibbs, Heather 19 113 76,11 71,28 63,64 58,93 12,47 12,34
Ginsherman, Martin 173 202 94,55 62,07 77,05 64,90 17,50 -2,83
Gone, Kamala-jean 10 70,00 70,00 60,55 58,76 9,45 11,24
Goodman, Brian 18 66,67 66,67 63,97 63,49 2,69 3,17
Gopie, Kamala-lean 52 73,08 73,08 62,69 59,22 10,38 13,86
Graff, Aida 1 39 48,72 47,37 54,21 51,68 -5,49 -4,31
Graub, Leon 21 142,86 42,86 57,42 55,19 -14,56 -12,34
Grewal, Jiti Singh Is 104 50,96 42,70 60,28 55,39 -9,32 -12,69
Griffith, George 135 39,26 39,26 51,32 51,03 -12,06 -11,77
Guay, Martial I 0,00 0,00 40,00 40,00 -40,00 -40,00
Hamelin, Michael 108 28,70 28,70 55,46 53,57 -26,76 -24,86
Hayes, Marnie 60 51,67 51,67 45,33 45,11 6,34 6,55
Hebert, Stephanie 5 42 61,90 56,76 44,76 41,58 17,15 15,18
Hitchcock, Fred 54 64,81 64,81 53,05 51,86 11,77 12,95
Hodgins, Barbara 32 28,13 28,13 48,20 46,76 -20,07 -18,63
Homsi, Elke 33 12,12 12,12 31,33 30,29 -19,21 -18,17
Houde, Roper 90 6,67 6,67 32,98 32,88 -26,31 -26,21
Hum, Oueenie 1 0,00 0,00 53,09 43,84 -53,09 -43,84
Ireland, Judy 51 60,78 60,78 60,69 58,91 0,09 1,87
Israel, Milton 98 64,29 64,29 54,61 54,20 9,67 10,08
jam, jean-Guy 14 35,71 35,71 54,43 53,90 -18,72 -18,18
joakim, Clive 29 128 55,47 42,42 62,32 55,45 -6,85 -13,02
obin, Michel 47 14,89 14,89 44,59 43,97 -29,70 -29,08
Kemsley, Thomas 14 28,57 28,57 51,61 50,80 -23,04 -22,23
Kitchener, Susan 107 92.52 92,52 5S,63 53,71 36,89 38,81
Knevel, A.C. 138 29,71 29,71 29,60 28,64 0,11 1,07
Lamont, Deborah 1 35 37,14 37,14 54,38 49,00 -17,23 -11,86
Landry, Girard 1 113 43,36 43,36 32,47 32,41 10,89 10,96
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Lang, Lawrence 54 48,15 48,15 64,53 61,58 -16,39 -13,43
Lapommeray, Jacques 133 75,19 75,19 53,53 52,56 21,66 22,63
Lebel, Guy 119 67,23 67,23 49,33 48,69 17,89 18,54
Leclercq, Dominique 80 91,25 91,25 53,05 51,75 38,20 39,50
Leighton, Margaret 1 51 49,02 48,00 57,60 53,75 -8,58 -5,75
Levesque, Sylvie 85 20,00 20,00 36,25 36,07 -16,25 -16,07
Lloyd, Christine 106 57,55 57,55 62,29 59,89 -4,74 -2,34
Makonnen, Yilma 66 69,70 69,70 58,97 53,91 10,72 15,79
Manios, George 98 62,24 62,24 56,66 56,28 5,59 5,96
Mccool, Carolyn 19 57,89 57,89 53,57 52,44 4,33 5,46
Mckenzie, Gordon 56 17,86 17,86 53,98 50,97 -36,13 -33,11
Member, Dco 2 0,00 0,00 41,08 40,64 -41,08 -40,64
Misir, Amarnath 45 71,11 71,11 57,65 55,12 13,46 15,99
Montgomery, Joan 71 81,69 81,69 60,57 S9,12 21,12 22,57
Moore, Beverly 10 50,00 50,00 59,06 55,70 -9,06 -5,70
Morrish, Deborah 37 62,16 62,16 64,04 63,60 -1,88 -1,44
Mortazavi, Fahimeh 67 31,34 31,34 55,16 54,53 -23,82 -23,19
Moss,Joel 108 82,41 82,41 51,15 49,86 31,25 32,55
Mutch, Stuart 22 86,36 86,36 55,22 55,14 31,14 31,22
Mutuma, Chimbo Poe 98 51,02 51,02 46,41 46,13 4,61 4,89
Oddie, Lily 128 69,53 69,53 55,95 54,83 13,59 14,70
Osmane, Farid 31 32,26 32,26 67,09 64,56 -34,83 -32,30
Ouirion, Richard 10 16 81,25 50,00 70,98 51,62 10,27 -1,62
Owen, Robert 26 100,00 100,00 55,22 55,14 44,78 44,86
Panagakos, Helene 56 57,14 57,14 33,26 33,18 23,88 23,96
Pattee, Ross 82 52,44 52,44 54,79 54,01 -2,35 -1,57
Pelletier, Jean-Paul 81 82,72 82,72 58,84 56,39 23,88 26,32
Pergat, Ludmila 11 0,00 0,00 40,93 39,78 -40,93 -39,78
Pinkney, Thomas 160 75,63 75,63 53,77 53,13 21,86 22,49
Pirbay, Joulekhan 72 56,94 56,94 35,53 35,20 21,42 21,74
Popatia, Berzoor 6 13 84,62 71,43 78,39 67,81 6,23 3,61
Prabhakara, Puttavee 120 50,00 50,00 55,13 54,61 -5,13 -4,61
Prevost, jean 101 20,79 20,79 41,37 40,92 -20,58 -20,13
Processus, Accelere 36 36 100,00 N/A 79,74 N/A 20,26 N/A
Quirion, Richard 120 145 91,03 48,00 72,51 56,73 18,53 -8,73
Railton, James 72 51,39 51,39 60,36 56,98 -8,97 -5,59
Randhawa, Saijad 46 2,17 2,17 60,06 57,09 -57,89 -54,92
Randhawa, Sarwanlit 84 19,05 19,05 57,90 51,34 -38,85 -32,29
Rangan, Veda 115 39,13 39,13 31,88 31,25 7,25 7,88
Robic, Louise 88 37,50 37,50 46,35 45,66 -8,85 -8,16
Robinson, Gerry 65 67,69 67,69 55,53 55,21 12,16 12,49
Robitaille, Paule 118 27,12 27,12 42,47 42,03 -15,35 -14,91
Ross, Hazelyn 8 12,50 12,50 60,55 60,25 -48,05 -47,75
Ross, Michael 40 65,00 65,00 54,80 53,76 10,20 11,24
Roy, Sylvie I 0,00 0,00 31,22 31,16 -31,22 -31,16
Ru ero, Alfonso 70 62,86 62,86 53,72 53,16 9,14 9,70
Saitos, Joanne 10 149 53,02 49,64 56,66 52,45 -3,64 -2,81
Sandhu, Ken 4 II1 31,53 28,97 60,22 56,46 -28,69 -27,49
Sandhu, Rands 1 1 100,00 N/A 72,73 N/A 27,27 N/A
Savage, Harvey 12 162 66,05 63,33 64,86 60,72 1,19 2,62
Shecter, Trudy 109 48,62 48,62 43,07 42,11 5,55 6,51
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Sort, William 88 71,59 71,59 59,87 59,26 11,73 12,33
5iddigue, K. 3 66,67 66,67 62,38 60,92 4,29 5,74
Siddigui, Yasmeen 19 68,42 68,42 57,06 56,12 11,37 12,30
Silvestri, Anna-Mari 77 75,32 75,32 63,32 61,00 12,01 14,33
Smith, Diane 43 37,21 37,21 59,38 56,14 -22,18 -18,93
Smith-Gordon, Mauree 67 85,07 85,07 58,94 58,36 26,13 26,72
Somers, Michael 77 53,25 53,25 56,71 56,35 -3,46 -3,10
Special Ctry 2 0,00 0,00 35,94 35,94 -35,94 -35,94
5tanwick, Nina 76 73,68 73,68 61,26 60,84 12,43 12,84
Tabibzadeh, Nasrin 37 78,38 78,38 52,32 47,52 26,06 30,86
lerrana, Anna 15 46,67 46,67 53,74 52,66 -7,07 -6,00
Thomas, Stephanie 33 24,24 24,24 51,32 51,01 -27,08 -26,77
Tinker, Diane 156 50,00 50,00 56,12 55,21 -6,12 -5,21
Tshisungu, Jose 25 64,00 64,00 64,03 62,50 -0,03 1,50
Tshisungu, Jose W.T. 39 41,03 41,03 52,43 50,79 -11,40 -9,77
Uppal, Atam 12 83,33 83,33 59,74 55,63 23,59 27,70
Valeriano, Patrice 88 31,82 31,82 38,72 37,64 -6,90 -5,82
Venne, Michel 38 78,95 78,95 66,98 64,28 11,97 14,67
Venton, Anne 23 26,09 26,09 50,42 47,58 -24,34 -21,49
Vienne, Michel 55 78,18 78,18 63,82 61,91 14,36 16,27
Wang, George 60 55,00 55,00 59,07 58,35 -4,07 -3,35
Weir, Margaret 128 16,41 16,41 30,35 29,21 -13,94 -12,80
Wilson, Wilbert 72 16,67 16,67 52,24 51,72 -35,58 -35,06
Wong, Bing 68 11,76 11,76 27,36 26,33 -15,60 -14,57
Wright, Philomen 1 0,00 0.00 20,75 20,75 -20,75 -20,75
,rotalat IRB in 2006 615 9984 54,08 51,06 54,08 51,06 N/A N/A
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